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Abstract
In clock games, agents receive differently-timed private signals when an asset value is above its fundamental. The price crashes to
the fundamental when K of N agents have decided to sell. If selling decisions are private, bubbles can be sustained because people
delay selling, after receiving signals, knowing that others will delay too. Our results replicate the main features of the one previous
experimental study of clock game (in two subject pools): Selling delays are shorter than predicted, but converge toward equilibrium
predictions over repeated trials. We also find that delays are shorter in a dynamic game in which selling decisions unfold over time,
compared to a static equivalent in which subjects precommit to selling decisions. A model of learning with growing anxiety after
signal arrival can reproduce the empirical observations of shorter-than-predicted delay, smaller delay after later signal arrival, and
shorter delays in dynamic games.
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1. Introduction
Many economic choices consist of whether to accept a sure
payoff or to wait for a risky payoff that is potentially larger,
where the risky payoffs from waiting depend on choices of oth-
ers. Examples include timing stock market trades, adopting
new technology, optimal timing of entry or product launches
to new growing markets, and bank runs [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. For
journalists and (sometimes) academics, a similar tradeoff exists
between publishing quickly or waiting to gather better informa-
tion. Waiting can improve the quality of an article but creates
an increasing risk of being scooped.
Our experimental study explores a stylized economic envi-
ronment with costs and benefits for waiting or taking an imme-
diate action. These clock games were introduced by Brunner-
meier and Morgan [7, 8] (henceforth BM) to create interesting
timing decisions in the presence of the trade-off between re-
wards from waiting versus risk of preemption.
Clock games are useful for several reasons. Under simpli-
fying conditions, they can be modeled formally. Optimal equi-
librium behavior has a surprisingly simple closed-form optimal
strategy (a timing decision). This sharp prediction about equi-
librium behavior makes it easy to detect any deviation from the
optimal strategy and then invites productive speculation about
why deviations occur, in a way that can be tested with more
experiments. Clock games also provide a general paradigm to
study psychological processes related to strategic reasoning of
what others will do, managing real-time emotions (e.g., anxiety
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and stress1), and revising a strategy based on feedback (learn-
ing based on reinforcement and regret from exiting too early or
waiting too long).
This study makes three contributions: (1) we replicate the
basic result of BM (despite substantial changes in procedure);
(2) we test strategic equivalence of dynamic and static imple-
mentations of the clock game; and (3) we provide a model of
subject learning during the experiment.
Our paper can be evaluated as an extensional part of a pack-
age with the original BM paper. BM introduced an interesting
paradigm and provided some experimental data comparing re-
sponse of behavior to some structural variables. They tested
theoretical predictions about timing decisions. Some parts of
the theory were not sharply supported by the data.
Our paper picks up where BM left off. We introduce a
slightly different experimental paradigm, in which human sub-
jects play against computerized rivals who play an equilibrium
strategy. We also compare a real-time dynamic game with a
strategically equivalent “static” form of the clock game in which
agents commit to strategies (conditional on private informa-
tion). The static game creates more data (it eliminates censoring
of data, for reasons that will become apparent) and also cre-
ates an interesting comparison between strategically-equivalent
1In psychology, several studies have used a “balloon task” (BART) which
is related to a clock game [9, 10]. In the balloon task a person can accept
a certain payoff or choose to inflate the balloon. Inflating the balloon has a
chance of increasing the certain payoff, but inflating also has a risk of bursting
the balloon, leaving a game-ending payoff of zero. Balloon games are thought
to be measures of impulsivity and self-control, akin to repeated use by drug
addicts and other challenges to self-control [11]. The clock game is a social
balloon task, in which the time at which the balloon bursts is determined the
actions of all players. A synthesis of the two types of tasks might prove useful
to distinguish private impulse control and social effects.
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dynamic and static forms. We find that there is a sharp differ-
ence in play in the two versions of the game. We provide some
evidence that this difference might be interpreted as “anxiety”
agents feel about uncertainty resolution in the dynamic game.
We also study the process of learning and see how individuals
adapt their strategy over time.
2. Theory
This section describes the dynamic clock game in detail.
This is the original form of the clock game with unobservable
actions created by BM, in which the game is played in real time
(hence the term dynamic). For ease of explanation of the ex-
periment later, we will frame the game environment as a stock
market with a speculative bubble.
In this game, a finite number, I , of players participate in the
stock market. At the start of the game, all players are in the
market. They decide when to sell the stock. Each player can
make exactly one selling decision before the game (or market)
ends once they sell their stock, that is a final decision and they
cannot buy it back.
The price of the stock starts at 1 and increases exponentially
at the rate of g; that is, at the period of t, the price is egt. At any
time period, sellers can privately sell their stock as long as the
market is still open.
At one point in time t0, a speculative bubble in the price
starts. The random variable t0 follows an exponential distri-
bution2 with parameter λ, whose probability distribution func-
tion is f(t0) = λe−λt0 . One interpretation of t0 is that it is
the period in which the current stock price starts exceeding the
stock’s true worth. The distribution of t0 is a common knowl-
edge, but the exact value of t0 is unknown to sellers. Instead,
seller i privately receives a signal at period ti indicating that t0
has happened (i.e., the price bubble has started). ti is also a
random variable which is uniformly distributed over the inter-
val, [t0, t0 + η]. By the period t0 + η, everybody has received
the signal, so hence η is called the window of awareness. The
signal arrival period is private information and sellers cannot
observe others’ signal arrival time.
Once K sellers have sold, the market crashes. If a seller
successfully sells the stock before the market crash, he will re-
ceive the price of the stock at the time of selling; that is, if he
sells the stock at period x, he will earn egx. His selling price
is not observed by others. Once the market crashes, the rest of
the sellers who did not sell on time only receive the post-crash
price, egt0 , which is the price at the bubble starting period, t0.
Note that a seller can be worse off if he sells too early. Selling
before t0, say at tx, means an opportunity loss since if he had
waited, he could have earned egt0 , which is larger than egtx .
There are two ways the market ends (crashes): (1) once
K(< I) sellers have sold, it crashes3; (2) it ends at the period of
2An important property of the exponential distribution is that it is memory-
less. Due to this memorylessness property, each period has a constant probabil-
ity of λ of being t0.
3If more than one seller sell exactly at the crash period, then a tie-breaking
rule applies one of the tied sellers will be randomly (with an equal probability
among them) chosen to sell his item.
t0+τ
∗ if fewer thanK sellers have sold the item by this period.
τ∗ is common knowledge and is assumed to be large enough to
ensure players will not take this exogenous ending period into
consideration of their selling strategy [7]. At the end of the mar-
ket, the earnings of all sellers are publicly announced without
individual identification.
This game structure has nice properties, which are conducive
to experimental tests. First, the dynamic clock game has a
unique symmetric Bayesian perfect equilibrium. Second, the
equilibrium strategy is fully characterized by a fixed constant.
More specifically, in the unique symmetric equilibrium, each
player (assuming risk neutrality) employs the following simple
strategy: wait for τ periods after signal arrival and then sell,
where
τ =
1
g
log(
λΦ(K, I, η(λ− g))
g − (g − λ)Φ(K, I, ηλ) )
and
Φ(a, b, x) =
(b− 1)!
(b− a− 1)!(a− 1)!
∫ 1
0
exzza−1(1−z)b−a−1dz.
Proof of the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium is
in BM [7].
The static version of the clock game is identical to the dy-
namic clock game except that agents precommit to a selling
time after observing their private information. Thus, the static
clock game is to the dynamic game as the first-price sealed bid
auction is to ascending and descending price auctions. All the
properties of the dynamic clock game except for the dynamic
structure will carry over to the static clock game.
In the static clock game, all sellers are given their signal
arrival time, ti. Each seller is then asked to privately submit
his selling time. Once all selling times are submitted, they are
then compared and the market ending period is determined by
the K-th earliest selling time. The K sellers with the earliest
selling times can sell at their selling time. The (I −K) sellers,
whose selling times are later than the market ending period, did
not sell in time, so they receive the post-crash price, egt0 . The
variables, t0 and ti, are determined as in the dynamic game.
BM prove that the dynamic clock game is strategically equiv-
alent to the static clock game: players in both types of the games
should sell τ periods after their signals.
We test this theoretical equivalence between the dynamic
and static clock games. This contrast is interesting because psy-
chological forces could be different in the dynamic and static
cases. For example, if subjects are anxious to resolve uncer-
tainty in the dynamic game, and trade off this anxiety for ex-
pected profits, they will sell earlier in the dynamic game than
in the equivalent static game (i.e. the delay after signal arrival
will be shorter in the dynamic game).
3. Experimental Design and Methods
38 subjects were recruited from the UCLA CASSEL lab (19
males, 19 females; mean age = 20.9±4.1 year; age range = 17-
2
42) and 25 subjects were recruited from Caltech (21 males, 4
females; mean age = 21.3±2.2 year; age range = 18-27).4
Before the experiment, subjects were informed about the
experiment and gave informed consent to participate according
to a protocol approved by Institutional Review Boards of the
University of California, Los Angeles CA (for the UCLA ses-
sions), and of the California Institute of Technology, Pasadena
CA (for the Caltech sessions).
In addition to the $5 show-up fee, subjects were paid what-
ever they earned during the experiment with the conversion rate
of 100 Experimental Dollars equal to 0.50 US dollar.
Stimulus presentation and the timing of all stimuli and re-
sponse events were achieved using Matlab (www.mathworks.com)
and the Psychtoolbox (www.psychtoolbox.org) on computers
running Microsoft Windows.
The experimental procedure followed the basic structure of
the experiments by BM. The experiment was framed as an asset
market in which subjects made selling time (price) decisions on
the stock they were holding. Each participant played in his own
market with computer players programmed to follow a theory-
predicted equilibrium strategy. Participants knew that they were
playing with five computer players (i.e., I = 6), who would
receive the same amount of information as they did and who
would employ a strategy constant throughout the experiment.
The strategy of the computer players remained unknown to the
participants.
An experimenter read instructions (see Appendix) aloud while
participants were provided with copies of the instructions to
read. To ensure that subjects understood the game structure
and procedure, a quiz was administered at the end of the in-
structions. Subjects who failed the quiz (answered two or more
questions incorrectly; see Appendix) twice were not allowed to
proceed and dismissed (n = 3).
Each individual completed 100 trading rounds– 5 blocks of
10 dynamic clock game trials and 5 blocks of 10 static clock
game trials. The dynamic blocks were interleaved with the
static blocks and half of the subjects started with a block of
dynamic trials and the other half with a static round block. In a
dynamic trial, subjects were asked to make a real-time decision
as to at what period (i.e., price) to sell the asset they were hold-
ing. At the start of each trading round, everyone (the subject
and five computer players) received a share of the same asset
with an initial price of $1. This price grew exponentially at the
rate of 4% in each period (i.e., g = 4%) as trading time periods
passed in real-time. Each period lasted 250 milliseconds. The
computer screen displayed a trajectory of the price graphically
4Seven additional subjects participated in the experiment. They were ex-
cluded from the analysis either because their response time in many static trials
was too short (these subjects either showed less than 2 seconds of average re-
sponse time (RT) in static trials or responded less than a second for more than
30% of all static trials. The average RT across all other subjects was 6.66 sec-
onds (SD = 2.91)) or their submitted selling times in static trials were highly
correlated with initial, default values (explained further in the next section),
implying that those subjects might have skipped trials by quickly pressing the
response key instead of submitting their actual selling time decisions and thus
added noise to the data. They obviously do not behave according to theory but
also do not provide much insight about alternative theory, either.
as well as the current price numerically (Figure 1). The cur-
rent price in each time period was the same for all 6 sellers (the
human subject and 5 computer rivals).
Figure 1: A dynamic clock game trial. The price trajectory from the start to
the current period is displayed in a price-period graph. The current price and
period are numerically displayed in the upper right corner of the screen.
At the start of each round, the computer determined the
post-crash price, which was described, in instructions to the par-
ticipants, as the maximum true value of the asset, or the value
when the true value stopped growing (i.e., t0). In each period,
there was a 2.5% probability that the true value stopped grow-
ing (i.e., λ = 2.5%). After the true value stopped growing, a
subject received a message (or a signal) indicating that the cur-
rent price of the asset is above its true value (Figure 2). This
message is delayed by an amount of time that is equally likely
to be anywhere from 0 to 60 periods (i.e., η = 60). Subjects
were told that the delay between the time the true value stopped
growing (t0) and the signal arrival (ti) was randomly chosen
independently for each player in each round.
Figure 2: Subjects receive a message about the true value with a random delay.
Once three or more sellers in a market sold their asset, the
round ended (i.e., K = 3). At this time, subjects received feed-
back about their current earnings as well as the prices at which
other sellers sold their asset (Figure 3). A subject’s earnings
in a dynamic round were determined as follows: if the subject
successfully sold the asset (i.e., he was among the first three
sellers to sell), he received the price of the asset at the time of
selling. Otherwise, the subject received an amount equal to the
maximum true value of the asset (post-crash price).
In summary, the values of the parameters used in this exper-
iment are as follows: Number of participants, I = 6; number
of sellers necessary for market crash, K = 3; price growth
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Figure 3: Once the market ends, subjects receive information on their earnings
and others selling price and the true value (the earnings of the last three subjects
to sell).
rate, g = 4%; the probability that the true value stops grow-
ing in each period, λ = 2.5%; exogenous ending parameter,
τ∗ = 300; window of awareness, η = 60.
With this set of parameter values, the equilibrium delay, τ ,
is 21 periods. That is, in equilibrium, once a subject receives
a signal, he should strategically delay for 21 periods until he
sells.
In a static trial, subjects were presented with all of the in-
formation that was revealed across time in the dynamic rounds,
all at once. More specifically, the signal arrival time ti was
known to subject i at the beginning of a trial, who was then
asked at what price (in what period) they would sell if they had
received the signal in period ti. The signal arrival period, ti,
varied between trials and was determined as in dynamic trials.
The period in which a message arrived was shown on the com-
puter screen. Subjects were allowed to explore the change in
stock price over time by moving a cursor on the screen (Fig-
ure 4). Once the cursor was placed at the desired selling time,
the participants would press the enter button to choose that time
and proceed. Once they submitted their decision, the computer
compared the selling times of all players (a human subject and
5 computer players) and determined earnings as in a dynamic
round.
Figure 4: A static trading round. Subjects explore the price over time by moving
the gray rectangular box along the horizontal bar at the bottom of the screen.
The initial position of the selling-time cursor is called an
anchor and was randomized in every trial in order to avoid (or
estimate) any potential anchoring effects.5
5In many decision making situations, an individual’s final decision or be-
BM’s original experiments used groups of six subjects. Our
experiments used one subject in each six-person group with five
computerized agents (who play the equilibrium strategy). Both
all-human and one-human groups are of interest for different
reasons.6 First, we can control “collusive” strategies. Subjects
cannot coordinate to wait longer than they would otherwise, and
split the high payoff outside the lab. Second, participants do
not face strategic uncertainty about behavior of other people;
instead, they face the challenge of learning the computerized
agents’ strategy. Third, using computer opponents also pre-
vents subject from being able to guess when other agents have
sold from physical sound such as key pressing (i.e., information
leakage).7
Our design permits within-subjects comparisons of the treat-
ment effects of the two versions of the game, dynamic and
static, which greatly enhances the power of the statistical tests.
In a within-subject comparison each subject “acts as their own
control”; this rules out the possibility that any measured differ-
ences in behavior in the two conditions are due to the idiosyn-
crasies of which group is solely assigned to which condition, as
in between-subject designs [17].
Static trials test the strategic equivalence of static imple-
mentation and the dynamic version in BM. An additional ben-
efit of static trials is that all selling decisions are observable. In
dynamic trials, if the market ends before a seller would have
sold, his strategic delay (the length of waiting periods between
the signal arrival and the selling) is not observed and is there-
fore right-censored. In the dynamic structure we used, infor-
mation about half of the subject-trials are censored in this way.
In static trials, however, we learn the precommitted delay of all
the subjects so no information is lost.
4. Results
We start with definitions of the terminology used in this sec-
tion. Delay, an empirical measure of strategic delay τ , is the de-
pendent variable of the most interest, and is defined as follows:
In dynamic trials,
1. If a subject received the signal and then he sold the as-
set afterwards (before the market crash), Delay is uncen-
sored (48% of the subject-trials8) and are defined as the
number of periods between the signal arrival period and
the selling time;
havior is influenced by an initial value or a reference point. This phenomenon
is called anchoring [12]. The location of the initial position was recorded during
the sessions at Caltech and these data were used as a check for subjects engage-
ment in the task. Three participants at one of the Caltech sessions showed 40%
to 60% correlation between their selling times and initial time anchor periods
(p < 0.005) in static trials and hence were discarded for further analysis. Their
average RT in static trials was also less than 2 seconds.
6Computerized agents have been used in many experimental studies on bar-
gaining and auctions [13, 14, 15, 16].
7This was indeed a small challenge for BM since mouse-clicking noise
could serve as an auditory cue about selling time to other subjects. To get
around this issue, they had subjects hover the mouse over a button to sell, which
unavoidably led to some erroneous sellings.
8This fraction, and all the others below, are very close for dynamic and static
trials (see Table A1)
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2. If the subject sold prior to or at the signal arrival pe-
riod, Delay is left-censored (9%) and coded as zero (left-
censored at 0);
3. If the subject received the signal but did not sell before
the market crash, Delay is right-censored (26%) and coded
as the number of periods between the signal arrival period
and the market ending time;
4. If the subject neither received the signal nor sold (i.e., the
market crashed before they got a signal) then Delay is
treated as missing (16%) and typically discarded.
Although all selling decisions in static trials were indeed
observed, for comparability of behavior in dynamic and static
trials, Delay in static trials is defined in the same manner when
we compare static and dynamic results.
Duration was defined as in BM, the length of periods from
t0 to the market ending. Early exit is an event in which a subject
sold prior to the signal arrival and which led to left-censored
Delay.
Success rate is the number of the trials in which a subject
sold before the market ending, divided by the number of all
trials.
Below we define the independent variables of relevance:
(a) Signal indicates the signal arrival time in periods;
(b) Condition is a categorical variable indicating a trial type
(dynamic or static);
(c) Group is a categorical variable indicating the group to which
a subject belongs (UCLA or Caltech);
(d) UCLA (Caltech) is a dummy variable for UCLA (Caltech):
1 if a subject participated in one of the UCLA (Caltech)
sessions and 0 otherwise;
(e) Dyn (Static) is a dummy variable for dynamic (static) tri-
als;
(f) Experience is a dummy variable to indicate a given trial
belongs to the last half of the experiment.
In the following subsections, we first examine the trials where
selling decisions were observed. Hence, therein Delay means
left-censored or uncensored Delay. When the trials with right-
censored Delay were included, the qualitative aspects of the
data did not change and these additional results are reported in
the appendix. Note that right-censored Delay is likely to under-
estimate actual Delay, and the left-censored Delay could over-
estimate the actual Delay that could have been negative, poten-
tially biasing the results.9 Therefore, we repeat all the analyses
using static trials only, with a redefinition of Delay as the length
of periods between the submitted selling time and the signal ar-
rival time; Delayuncensored denotes this new definition of De-
lay. Note that Delayuncensored permits negative values when a
subject sold prior to the signal arrival. Using Delayuncensored
yields qualitatively identical to those obtained using the Delay
measure.
9BM is aware of this censoring problem. To get around the problem, they
estimated the delay measure using the Tobit procedure, assuming that the right-
censored delay is normally distributed with mean τ . However, this specification
is likely to yield an estimate in favor of τ .
In theory, all sellers are ex ante identical in a sense that in
equilibrium they all employ the same unique symmetric strat-
egy. Hence in analyzing data, we do not distinguish the be-
havior of 1st, 2nd, and 3rd sellers (following BM, who do the
same). Reported p-values are two-sided unless noted otherwise.
4.1. Descriptive Statistics
First we describe some very basic properties of the data.
Due to sampling variation, the distribution of signal arrivals
happened to be slightly different between the dynamic and static
trials. As a result, the durations of trials are also slightly differ-
ent (see Appendix). Later analyses control for these differences.
The success rates between dynamic (M = 0.57, SD =
0.13) and static trials (M = 0.57, SD = 0.14) were not sig-
nificantly different in the two conditions or between subject
pools.10 However, it is noticeable that they are substantially
above 50%, which is the fraction expected if subjects are play-
ing the equilibrium delay strategy. (It is the first indication that
they are generally selling earlier than the theory predicts.) The
rates for dynamic and static trials are also highly correlated
within subjects (r(61) = 0.59, p < 4.24 × 10−7; Appendix
Figure A1), which indicates stable individual differences in
how long subjects tend to wait in both conditions.
The next analyses look at properties of the distribution of
delays after signal arrival, before selling. There are four basic
results: Delays are shorter than predicted, longer in the static
condition, depend on signal arrival time, and grow longer with
experimental experience.
Short delays: Figures 5AB show the average of Delay in
the two conditions pooled, and within each subject pool. Us-
ing each individual’s mean Delay as a datum, the group av-
erages are highly significantly below the theory prediction of
τ = 21.11 The short average delays are substantially influ-
enced by the left-censored observations (i.e., early pre-signal
selling) which are set to zero. In static trials where all sell-
ing decisions are observed, the mean Delayuncensored is 19.23
(Median = 16.76, SD = 10.35), which is insignificantly
different than τ = 21 in a parametric test (one sample t-test,
t(62) = −1.36, one sided p = 0.18), but is significantly dif-
ferent using a non-parametric test (one-sample signed-rank test,
z-value = −2.27, p = 0.02).
Static delays are longer than dynamic delays: Figures 5AB
compare delays in the static and dynamic conditions. A two-
way ANOVA indicated both a significant difference between
dynamic and static delay (the static delays are longer), and sig-
nificantly shorter delays for the UCLA group (due to the differ-
ence in dynamic trials only). Figure 6 shows distributions of
individual average Delay.
Delays depend on signal arrival time: In both the dynamic
and static clock games, delays in selling after receiving a signal
10Paired t-test, t(62) = −0.17, p = 0.87; signed rank test, z-value
= −0.003, p = 0.997). Between the UCLA and the Caltech subjects, dy-
namic trials: two-sample t-test, t(61) = −0.64, p = 0.52; static trials: two-
sample t-test, t(61) = −1.44, p = 0.15.
11The tests are t(62) = −5.32, p < 7.57 × 10−7; signed rank test, z-
value = −4.40, p < 0.0001). This pattern did not change when the trials with
right-censored Delay were included (Figures A2, A3).
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Figure 5: Difference in average Delay between dynamic and static trials.
Dashed lines in red indicate the theory-predicted delay, τ = 21. Error bars
indicate standard errors. (A) Delay by trial type. (B) Delay by group and trial
type.
Figure 6: Distribution of individual average Delay between dynamic and static
trials.
should be constant, due to the “memoryless” property of the ex-
ponential distribution of underlying t0. However, this property
is quite counterintuitive; it means that conditional on not hav-
ing received a signal, agents should behave in exactly the same
way independently of the period they are in.
This predicted independence of delay from signal arrival is
not evident in the data. Figure 7 shows scatter plots of Delay
against the signal arrival time in dynamic and static trials. De-
lays are much longer for early signal arrival and much shorter
for later signal arrival (left-censoring observations). We also
binned the signal arrival periods into 6 bins, by 25 periods start-
ing from 0, except for the last bin (rare signal periods over 125
periods were binned all together) and then compared Delay be-
tween dynamic and static trials in each of the 6 time bins. Delay
decreased as a function of the signal arrival time in both dy-
namic and static trials. Further, in each time bin mean Delay in
static trials was longer than in dynamic trials (Figure 8). This
pattern was preserved when the trials with right-censored Delay
were included (Figure A4).
We further examined if there is any group specific effect on
Delay by conducting Tobit regression analysis [18] for Delay
(Table 1). The effect of signal arrival time on delay is strongly
significant across various model specifications. Both of the
UCLA and the Caltech groups waited longer to sell in static
trials than in dynamic trials, although on average the length of
Figure 7: Distribution of Delay against the signal arrival period by trial type.
Note that negative Delays are censored at 0.
Figure 8: Delay as a function of the signal arrival period. Delay decreases as a
signal arrives later. Error bars indicate standard errors. *** p < 0.001, ∗p <
0.05 (paired t-test, one sided).
delay in static trials was longer in the Caltech group. Further-
more, the Caltech subjects exhibited less sensitivity of Delay to
the signal arrival period in dynamic trials than in static trials. A
similar pattern was found when the trials with right-censored
Delay were included (Table A1). Delayuncensored also de-
creased as a function of the signal arrival period (Figure A5).12
There is also tentative evidence that sensitivity of delay to ar-
rival time was greater in subjects with higher risk-aversion.13
Experience and delay: Next we report whether subjects sell-
ing strategy was adaptive over time (see below for more detail).
Comparing the first 50 and last 50 trials, the delays are longer in
the last 50 trials and the dynamic vs. static difference in Delay
12Furthermore, Delayuncensored showed very different behavior between
the two groups than shown by the previous analyses (Figure A6 and Table
A3). The Caltech subjects showed less variance in Delay over all signal pe-
riods compared to the UCLA subjects. Caltech subjects’ average length of
Delayuncensored was shorter and the decrease in their Delayuncensored
measure was less sensitive to the signal delay. In both subject groups, the sig-
nal arrival period was a highly significant predictor of Delayuncensored, but
the effect of the signal arrival period differed between the two groups: it was
smaller (in an absolute sense) for the Caltech participants than for the UCLA
participants.
13One clue about sensitivity of delay to arrival time comes from an analy-
sis of risk preferences. In a subsample of 12 subjects we measured prospect-
theoretic preferences over risky gambles using a procedure described else-
where [19]. The sensitivity of delay to signal arrival (measured by a linear
regression) was modestly correlated with utility function curvature over gains
(r(10) = 0.64, p = 0.025) and losses (r(10) = 0.48, p = 0.099).
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Table 1: Results of random-effects Tobit regression analyses for Delay censored at 0 (subject random-effects incorporated)
Variable A B C D E F
Constant 30.724† 29.15† 28.892† 28.612† 30.572† 29.418†
(0.430) (0.398 (0.472) (0.486) (0.430) (0.672)
Signal -0.196† -0.194† -0.194† -0.190† -0.204† -0.202†
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.009)
UCLA*Static 3.231† 3.651† 4.537†
(0.420) (0.442) (0.906)
Caltech*Dyn 0.521 -4.902† -1.768*
(0.573) (0.799) (0.996)
Caltech*Static 2.580† 1.461
(0.576) (0.971)
Signal*UCLA*Static -0.009 -0.02
(0.010) (0.013)
Signal*Caltech*Dyn 0.010 0.038† 0.036**
(0.007) (0.011) (0.013)
Signal*Caltech*Static 0.016 0.017
(0.010) (0.012)
Caltech -0.250
(0.491)
Static 2.787† 3.816†
-0.32 -0.651
Log likelihood -11527.7 -11498.8 -11488.4 -11491.7 -11491.2 -11477.7
Left-censored at Delay = 0 584
Uncensored 3012
Right-censored 0
Included Observations 3596
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. †p < 0.0001, ** p < 0.01.
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is smaller in the last 50 trials (Figure 9). Regression analyses
ofDelayuncensored confirm these significant learning effects in
both groups (Table A2).
Figure 9: Delay as a function of the signal arrival period, moderated by expe-
rience. (A) First 50 trials. (B) Last 50 trials. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, *
p < 0.05, n.s.: not significant (paired t-test, one sided)
We also measure learning at the individual level by defin-
ing δ =
√
(delay − τ)2 which is the absolute deviation of de-
lay choices from the predicted equilibrium τ and comparing δs
in the first and second halves of 50 trials. Most of the sub-
jects exhibited higher δ in the first half of the experiment than
in the second half (Figure 10). Comparable results hold for
Delayuncensored trials.
Figure 10: Scatter plot of average δs for the first and the last halves of the ex-
periment. (A) Dynamic trials. (B) Static trials. Diagonal lines indicate 45 de-
gree line. Significance tests: Dynamic trials, paired t-test, t(62) = 6.14, p <
6.75 × 10−8 ; signed rank test, z-value = −5.09, p < 3.64 × 10−7. Static
trials, paired t-test, t(62) = 5.78, p < 1.80× 10−6; signed rank test, z-value
= −4.60, p < 4.21× 10−6.
Although early exits before signal arrival should never oc-
cur in theory, there were early exits in 9.3% of all trials (584
incidents out of 6278). Early exits were more common for later
signal arrival, for static trials, and in earlier trials compared to
later trials (i.e., early exits were reduced by experience).
4.2. A comparison with the BM data
In this section, we report some new analyses of some of the
original data from BM, for the purpose of comparison with our
data.14 The unobservable treatment in their paper has an identi-
14Their paper also contains an interesting comparison of delays for the
first three subjects to receive signals (which theory makes specific predictions
about). They also contrast the unobserved-selling treatment with a treatment in
which selling decisions are observed by all agents. In this “observed” condi-
tion all agents should sell immediately after the first sale is announced (due to
a ’stampede’ unravelling argument), which is essentially observed in the data.
cal structure to the dynamic trials in our experiment except for
different parameter values and some procedural differences.
In the original BM experiments unobservable treatment, there
were 6 experimental sessions and 12 human subjects partici-
pated in each session. In every trial, there were 2 independent
groups; 6 subjects participated in one and the rest of them in
the other. Each session consisted of 45 trials (called “rounds”
by BM). Each experimental period lasted 500 msec in real time
(ours were 250 msec). The following parameter values were
used for the experiment:
(a) Number of participants: I = 6.
(b) Number of sellers necessary for market crash: K = 3.
(c) Price growth rate: g = 2%
(d) The probability that the true value stops growing in each
period: λ = 1%
(e) Exogeneous ending parameter: τ∗ = 200
(f) Window of awareness: η = 90.
Under this parameter set, the (risk-neutral) equilibrium strategic
delay τ is 23 periods, a little longer than the equilibrium τ = 21
in our design.
Like BM, we discard the few observations in which selling
occurs within the first 10 periods after the start of the trial. For
comparability with our results, we did not distinguish sellers
according to the order of their signal receiving time. All the
definitions of the variables remain the same. Herein only trials
with uncensored and left-censored Delays (trials with success-
ful selling) were analyzed.
In BM’s data, mean Delay was shorter than the prediction,
τ = 23, in all sessions (Figure 11A). Most of the subjects ex-
hibited mean Delay that is significantly shorter than 23 periods
(one sample t-test, t(71) = −18.81, p < 2.74× 10−29; signed
rank test, z-value = −7.33, p < 2.23× 10−13; Figure 11B).
Figure 11: Average Delay. (A) Delay in different sessions. A dashed line
indicates the theory-predicted delay, τ = 23. Error bars indicate standard
errors. (B) Histogram of Delay. Bin center: even numbers, starting at 2 and
ending at 26; bin size: 2.
Delay was also dependent on the signal arrival time and was
negatively correlated with the signal arrival time (Figure 12,
Table 2). Note that the coefficient for the signal arrival time in
the Tobit model (-0.209 in Table 2) is very close to those in our
data (-0.190 – -0.204; see Table 1).
Further, we examined the effect of learning on Delay. Re-
gardless of experience, the signal arrival time remained as a
significant predictor of Delay (Figures 13, 14 and Table 3).
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Table 2: Results of random-effects Tobit regression analyses of Delay on the signal arrival time (subject random-effects incorporated)
Dependent Variable Delay
Independent Variable Coefficients Std. Err. z-stat p-value
Signal -0.209 0.007 -29.11 0.0001
Constant 36.667 0.794 46.19 0.0001
Log likelihood -4399.32
Number of Groups 72
Wald χ2 test statistics = 847.16 p-value = 0.0001
Left-censored Observations 452
Uncensored Observations 1055
Included Observations 1507
Figure 12: Delay as a function of the signal arrival period. Error bars indicate
standard errors. X-axis: signal arrival period where 1 indicates signal arriving
between 0 and 25; 2 between 26 and 50; 3 between 51 and 75; 4 between 76
and 100; 5 between 101 between 125; 6 between 126 and 150; 7 between 151
and 175; 8 between 176 and 200; 9 from 201 onwards.
However, Delay increased in the last 25 trials compared to the
first 20 trials (Figure 14 and Table 3) as observed in our data
(see Delay in the dynamic trials in Figure 9).
The deviation measure δ increased as a function of the sig-
nal arrival time, but decreased in later trials (Table 4).
In summary, despite differences in design and procedures
(e.g., human subjects competing against each other instead of
computerized rivals; different parameter values), the BM data
showed qualitative results similar to ours.
5. Learning and anxiety
Previous literature has not considered how a player’s delay
changes through learning across trials. In this section we pro-
pose a specific model and simulate its behavior to see how well
the simulated patterns fit statistical features of the data.
Some strategic learning models in literature are possible
candidates (see Camerer [20]). Reinforcement learning mod-
els adjust the numerical strength of a strategy based on its past
successes and failures (and numerical strength is mapped into
choice probability in some way). In the clock game setting, a
strategy corresponds to a particular selling time as a function
of signal arrival. The shortcoming of these types of models in
Figure 13: Scatter plot of Delay and the signal arrival time by experience.
games like this, with many strategies and relatively few strate-
gies, is that reinforcement does not learn fast enough to match
the empirical pace of human learning observed in experimental
data.15 For reinforcement learning to work, each possible strat-
egy has to be sampled several times. In this game, there are 300
choices of times when a player can sell, and only 100 trials,
so simple reinforcement is likely to learn too slowly without
modification.
Another popular model is “fictitious play”, in which players
build up statistical belief about the likely choices of opponents.
The limit of this model is that in the experiments, subjects only
learn about bounds on the previous choices of two or three op-
ponents (out of five), since all they find out for certainty is when
the market ended. So without more assumptions about beliefs
from partially-observed data the model cannot be applied.
An alternative is reinforcement plus “fictive learning” (e.g.,
a key element of EWA [23]). Fictive learning simply refers
to adjustment of strategy likelihoods from model-based knowl-
edge of the payoffs that would have been earned from a strategy
15This limit of reinforcement learning has been known for many years. It
produces especially poor results in many-person games in which only one per-
son earns a reward (e.g., “market games” [21]; LUPI lottery games [22]; and
auctions). Two interesting generalizations which sometimes fit actual learning
better are the inclusion of an aspiration level, and/or spreading reinforcement
from one strategy to neighboring strategies. Both of these modifications are
practically similar to including fictive learning as in EWA and other models.
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Table 3: Results of random-effects Tobit regression analyses of Delay on the signal arrival time and experience (subject random-effects incorporated)
Independent Variable A B
Constant 34.973† 34.342†
(0.872) (1.118)
Signal -0.211† -.202†
(0.007) (0.011)
Experience 2.907† 4.143*
(0.697) (1.432)
Signal * Experience -0.0139
(0.014)
Log likelihood -4388.37 -4388.93
Number of Groups 72 72
Wald χ2 stat. (p-value) 867.93 (< 0.001) 870.51 (< 0.001)
Left-censored Observations 452 452
Uncensored Observations 1055 1055
Included Observations 1507 1507
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. †p < 0.0001, ∗p < 0.005.
Table 4: Results of random-effects regression analyses of δ on the signal arrival period and the trial number (subject random-effects incorporated)
Dependent Variable δ
Variable Coefficients Std. Err. z-stat p-value
Signal 0.038 0.002 15.82 0.0001
Trial # -0.023 0.006 -3.53 0.0001
Constant 14.235 0.514 27.71 0.0001
R2 0.1427
Number of Groups 72
Wald χ2 test statistics = 260.86 p-value = 0.0001
Included Observations 1507
The interaction between Signal and Trial # was not significant and thus not included.
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Figure 14: Delay as a function of the signal arrival period, moderated by expe-
rience. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.02, * p < 0.07, n.s.: not significant (paired
t-test, one-sided). X-axis: signal arrival period where 1 indicates signal arriving
between 0 and 30; 2 between 31 and 60; 3 between 61 and 90; 4 between 91
and 120; 5 between 121 and 150; 6 between 151 and 180; 7 from 181 onwards.
that was not chosen (also called its foregone payoff). Fictive
learning is faster because it allows adjustment of strategies that
were considered but not played. There is also accumulating ev-
idence that fictive learning prediction error signals are present
in the dopaminergic system [24] and in monkey neural firing
rates [25].
To simplify the analysis, and fit the feedback properties of
the experimental data, we exploit the fact that a player’s payoff
is only affected by the selling time of the third player, which is
dependent on the signal arrival time. Given this, we propose the
following learning rule across trials in the clock game:
• Denote periods by n, and the estimate of the third seller’s
delay after period n by τˆ3(n). Initialize τˆ3(0) = 0. This
initialization is chosen to see how well the model can
learn that sellers delay substantially after signal arrival,
from a starting point of no delay at all.
• Infer the fundamental period, t0, and the third seller’s
selling time, tsell3 from the payoff feedback at the end of
the period. (Keep in mind that at the end of each period,
subjects learn the payoffs to all players. The payoffs to
the three players who did not sell before the market crash
reveal t0(n)). Obtain an estimate of τ3(n) after period n
from feedback using:
τˆ3
∗ = tsell3 (n)− E[tsignal3 (n)|t0(n)] (1)
Here the expected signal arrival time for the third seller
given the fundamental signal time, E[tsignal3 (n)|t0(n)],
is t0(n) + h(η), since the signal arrives after t0 within a
time window of length η. The quantity h(η) is the ex-
pected value of signal arrival time for the third-fastest
signal (the third-order statistic of the six draws for sig-
nal arrival), which is h(η) = 37η.
16
16The distribution of the k-th order statistic out of I items for uniformly
distributed values between [0, η] is Beta distributed, U(k) ∼ Beta(k, I +1−
k), with an expected value of E[U(k)] =
k
I+1
η. This is equal to 3
7
η in our
case, with I = 6 and k = 3.
• Given the estimate of τˆ3∗, update τˆ3(n) according to the
learning rule:
τˆ3(n) = τˆ3(n− 1) + α(τˆ∗3 − τˆ3(n− 1)) (2)
where α is a learning rate. A higher value of α represents
faster learning. Note that for simplification, if learning
player i is the player who sells third, then the same up-
dating equation holds using her own observed delay in
place of τˆ∗3
The model assumes that during a trial, players are constantly
adjusting beliefs about signal arrival, forecasting when the third
seller is likely to sell, and maximizing their expected payoffs
given those beliefs. Each player maintains an adjustable belief
that the current time, t, is before the likely selling time tsell3 ,
P (t < tsell3 ). The expected value of selling at time t is given by
EV (t) = egtP (t < tsell3 ) + E[e
gt0 ]P (t > tsell3 ) (3)
whereE[egt0 ] is the expected end-of-game payoff. For simplic-
ity, we assume that the player maintains a point estimate of the
third player’s selling time, ˆt3(n). Thus P (t < tsell3 ) is a step
function, with P (t < tsell3 ) = 1 if t < t3(n) and 0 otherwise.
To estimate tsell3 we assume that the player uses the es-
timated strategic delay of τˆ3(n) after receiving her signal at
tsignal3 . Then the estimate of the 3rd player’s selling time is
tsell3 = τˆ3(n) + E[t
signal
3 |tsignali ] (4)
where E[tsignal3 |tsignali ] is the expectation of the 3rd player’s
signal arrival time, given that her own signal arrived at tsignali .
Given eq. 3 and eq. 4, the player will sell at time tselli = tˆ3(n)
sell−
1. Selling decisions are different in the static and dynamic case.
• Static case: The player knows her own signal arrival time
tsignali . Since she has no idea whether her signal arrival
was early or late (compared to other players), the ex-
pected signal arrival time of the third seller is given by:
E[tsignal3 |tsignali ] =
∫ tsignali
tsignali −η
φ(t0|tsignali )E[tsignal3 |t0]
=
∫ tsignali
tsignali −η
φ(t0|tsignali )(t0 + h(η))
= E[t0|tsignali ] + h(η)
where the conditional probability of the fundamental time
t0 given player i’s signal arrival time t
signal
i , φ(t0|tsignali )
is given by:
φ(t0|tsignali ) =
λe−λt0
1− e−λti − (1− e−λ(ti−η)) (5)
• Dynamic case: There are two cases to consider–when the
signal has or has not arrived by the time of the selling
decision. If the signal has arrived, the expectation and
selling decision strategy is the same as in the static case.
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If the signal has not arrived at time t (i.e., t < tsignali ),
the player estimates:
E[t0] =
1
λ
E[tsignal3 |tsignali ] =
1
λ
+ h(η)
Based on the above, we can construct a simple algorithm
for decision-making in the clock game if players follow this
learning rule:
• Static condition: In period n, the player i sells at time
tselli , given by:
tselli (n) =
ˆτ3(n) + E[t0|tsignali ] + h(η)− 1 (6)
• Dynamic condition: The player waits until period 1
λ
+
h(η) for the signal. If it does not arrive by then, the player
sells. If the signal arrives by then, the player sells at the
same period tselli (n) as in the static case.
• Learning: Learning is expressed entirely by the linear up-
dating of the estimate τˆ(n) based on the feedback from
the end of the trial, using the fictive learning rule given in
the previous section.
The decision rule given above does not predict one key em-
pirical aspect of behavior: the negative correlation between de-
lay and signal arrival time. There are two likely explanations
for this relation. One is that subjects misperceive the memo-
ryless property of the exponential distribution of window-of-
awareness initiation; so they think if they got a signal early in
the trial their signal was probably relatively early, and if they
got a late signal their signal was probably relatively late. The
other possible explanation is that there is nonpecuniary emo-
tional penalty for waiting to sell, due to anxiety which grows
throughout the trial. We explore the latter possibility by simply
including a reduced-form anxiety term χt which speeds up the
selling decision.
tselli (n) =
ˆτ3(n) + E[t0|tsignali ] + h(η)− χt (7)
The anxiety term grows linearly with time and the player has a
stronger tendency to sell earlier as time increases.
We can now summarize the predictions of the decision rules
decribed above:
• Delay decreases as signal arrival time increases:
This is due to the linearly growing anxiety term χt. Play-
ers sell at a comparatively earlier time, and the delay-
signal arrival relation is more negative, if the anxiety pa-
rameter χ is higher.
• Players can sell before receiving a signal, and there are
more of these early sales in the dynamic condition:
If the signal arrives very late, the players will sell ear-
lier than their signal arrival time. In the dynamic condi-
tion, the players will sell at period
1
λ
+ h(η) if the signal
doesn’t arrive by then. So there will be a greater number
of early sales in the dynamic condition.
• Delay increases with learning:
If the initial estimate of the canonical delay τˆ is low, then
players’ beliefs converge towards the equilibrium delay τ
with learning, according to the fictive learning rule. Their
own selling delays will also increase with learning.
5.1. Behavioral delay responses to regret
This fictive learning model posits that the change in the
player’s delay in the next round will be influenced by the es-
timation error τˆ3∗ − τˆ3(n) times the learning rate α. We can
see evidence of this relationship in the behavioral data. Define
a player’s regret as the difference between the player’s selling
time and the selling time of the third seller. In figure 15, the
player’s regret is plotted on the x-axis. If the player does not
sell in time she incurs negative regret; if she sells too early re-
gret is positive regret. On the y-axis, we plot the change in that
player’s delay in the following round. A linear fit to the data
gives a slope of 0.32. Thus, for every period of positive regret
(early selling), the delay in the following round goes up by 0.32
periods.
Figure 15: The change in delay in the following round when the player sells
too early or too late and incurs regret in the static condition. Slope of linear fit
is 0.5 when player sells too early, and 0.3 when he sells too late.
In the dynamic condition, the game ends when the third
player sells. Therefore, there is only a bounded measure of
when three of the players, who “virtually” sold too late, would
have sold. However, there is a measure of early (negative) re-
gret when a player sold too early. We plot the player’s regret
versus change in delay for the dynamic case in figure 16. That
slope is .69 periods. This seems to be substantially higher than
adjustment in the static case, but there is no clear way to com-
pare the two adjustment slopes.
Figure 16: The change in delay in the following round when the player sells too
early and incurs positive regret in the dynamic case. Slope of linear fit: 0.69.
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5.2. Simulations
We run simulations of the model to investigate the effects of
the learning rate, α, and anxiety, χ, parameters. We varied the
parameters α between 0 and 0.2 in increments of 0.02, and χ
between 0 and 0.2 in increments of 0.1. We ran 50 simulations
for each pair of parameter values using different seeds. We note
the following results:
• There is a negative correlation between delay and signal
arrival time for both the static condition, shown in Figure
17, and the dynamic condition, Figure 18. We plot the
resulting delay for different values of χ.
• The delay increases for faster learning rate α, as shown
in Figure 19 for the static case for trials 26-50, and in
Figure 20, for the dynamic case.
• The simulated player’s estimate of the canonical delay
of the third sell, τˆ3 converges towards the equilibrium
delay after learning in both the static (Figure 21) and the
dynamic conditions.
• The delay increases significantly after learning, as shown
in Figure 22 (trials 1-25) and Figure 23 (trials 26-50).
The number of early exits also significantly lessens in
the later trials for both the static and dynamic conditions.
However, the delay is generally shorter, and the number
of early sales greater, in the dynamic compared to the
static condition.
Figure 17: Delay in the static case as a function of the signal arrival time (in
trials 26-50 of learning). Different delays are observed when the anxiety pa-
rameter is varied from 0, 0.07, 0.14 to 0.2.
Figure 18: Delay in the dynamic case as a function of the signal arrival time
(in trials 26-50 of learning). Different delays are observed when the anxiety
parameter is varied from 0, 0.07, 0.14 to 0.2.
Figure 19: Effects of delay in the static case after learning: 26-50 trials. The
learning rate is varied from 0 to 0.1 to 0.2.
Figure 20: Effects of delay in the dynamic case after learning: 26-50 trials. The
learning rate is varied from 0 to 0.1 to 0.2.
5.3. Parameter fits from behavioral data
We find the values of the parameters α and χ that match
the behavioral data as closely as possible. For this purpose, we
need to find an appropriate metric to compare actual data and
simulated data. We use the absolute deviation from the equi-
librium delay, δi =
√
(delayi − τ)2. This is a good metric if
the goal is to explain when the behavior deviates from equilib-
rium. We consider values of α between 0 and 0.2 in gradations
of 0.02, and χ between 0 and 0.2 in gradations of 0.1.
For each pair of parameter values, we compute the mean
absolute difference between the deviation from the equilibrium
delay from the simulation at period t, δi(α, χ)(t), and the de-
viation for the actual player, across all the 50 periods, for each
player Thus,
Err(α, χ) =
1
50
50∑
t=1
√
(δi(α, χ)(t)− δi(t))2 (8)
We find the pair of value αˆ and χˆ for which the error,Err(α, χ),
is minimized. Table 5.3 shows the best fits for all the subjects
combined in the Caltech and UCLA pools. In the Appendix,
Tables A4 and A5 show the best fit for individual subjects in
the Caltech and UCLA pools.
Pool Mean Dev Std Error Anxiety Learning Rate
Caltech 10.49 2.04 0.03 0.16
UCLA 12.77 1.96 0.04 0.11
Table 5: Best fit to the aggregate behavioural data for the Caltech and UCLA
subject pools.
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Figure 21: The estimates of τ3 after learning, against the number of trials, for
the static and dynamic conditions. The initial estimate at time t=1 is 0. The
learning rate, α = 0.2.
Figure 22: Effects of delay in the static and dynamic case during learning: 1-25
trials. The delay in the dynamic case is significantly less than in the static case.
6. Discussion and Conclusions
The clock games we explore experimentally are models of
situations in which investors receive a signal that an asset value
has stopped growing (its fundamental value has been deter-
mined), but also know that others may not have received the
signal yet. Therefore, in equilibrium there is a period of delay
in which all investors can know the price is above the funda-
mental, but keep trading anyway but it is not commonly known
that prices are too high. BM define a general class of “clock
games” with nice structure that makes many sharp predictions.
The central feature of the games is how long people wait to sell
after finding out (with certainty) that the asset is overpriced; this
waiting period is called the “delay”.
Our paper replicates and extends findings in the original ex-
perimental paper of BM [7, 8]. An important contribution is that
we replicate a basic finding of their paper, which is that actual
delay is reasonably close to the delay predicted in equilibrium
(assuming risk-neutrality), and with learning over repeated tri-
als actual delays move in the direction of equilibrium. However,
we also focus on three major empirical findings that are not ex-
plained by the existing theory, and show how extended theories
can explain these interesting deviations.
First, the subjects’ strategic delay decreased as a function of
the signal arrival period, despite the theoretical prediction of a
fixed delay, independent of the signal arrival time. The fact that
delays were lower when signals arrived later holds for all sub-
ject pools, experimental conditions (static and dynamic), per-
sists throughout the experiment, and is true when human sub-
jects competed against other human participants (in BM data)
and when they faced computerized opponents choosing equilib-
rium delays (in our data). The signal dependence could be due
to misperception of the memoryless process underlying the as-
Figure 23: Effects of delay in the static and dynamic case after learning: 26-50
trials. The delay in the dynamic case is significantly less than in the static case,
however the delay has increased significantly after learning for both conditions.
set values, but we also show in simulations that it is consistent
with a growing sense of anxiety, a preference for trading off
anxiety with money. (We’ll say more about anxiety shortly).
Second, we found that the subjects’ strategy changed as
they gained more experience (this was also noted by BM but not
explored in their paper). Across trials, delays grew longer and
the negative relation between signal arrival and delay became
smaller. We show in some simulations that a model of fictive
learning about the selling time of the third-selling player, could
reproduce some of these learning effects.
Third, and most interestingly, we compared a dynamic ver-
sion of the game (played over time) and a static version in which
signal arrival times and selling delays are all committed in ad-
vance, then combined to determine an outcome (like sealed bid
auctions). The subjects consistently sold more rapidly (i.e., had
shorter delays) in the dynamic clock game than in the static
game.
One explanation for the static-dynamic behavior difference
is that given time constraints, reasoning and strategic compu-
tations in dynamic trials were not as precise as in static trials
and led to more erroneous decisions. However, if this explana-
tion was correct, errors should be diminished as the subject gain
more experience. Indeed, in later trials the dynamic and static
differences were attenuated, but did not disappear and remained
significant in later trials. (Also, exactly the opposite argument
is sometimes made to account for the fact that bidding in sealed-
bid auction is often different than in structurally equivalent as-
cending price auctions; e.g., Kagel and Levin [26]). Another
possibility is that subjects were trying to speed up the experi-
ment to increase hourly earnings, but this is unlikely for several
reasons.17
A more likely explanation is that simply waiting for the
17If the subjects had wanted to finish the experiment earlier to do something
else or just for leisure, every second they waited could have incurred an implicit
constant opportunity cost or a shadow price of waiting. However, because they
were competing with the computer rivals, they could not actually speed up the
experiment as they would have wished. Had they sold early in order to termi-
nate the round, they would have still had to wait until the other two computer
players sold, not earning as much. In addition, note that the average delay signal
for each time bin in the dynamic case actually increased, rather than decreasing
in later trials. This seems inconsistent with the shadow price argument since
by then, distracted subjects most likely would have been even more bored of
playing the same game over 50 times (which means increased shadow price).
Also, they could have actually sped up the static trials by keeping on pressing
the enter key and submitting the randomly selected anchor values in every static
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trial to progress generates more anxiety in the dynamic case.
In the dynamic trials, a subject makes a flow of decisions be-
tween selling now or waiting another period in every period,
in a faced-paced environment, under time pressure–each period
only lasts a quarter of a second. Participating in a rapidly pro-
gressing, dynamic game can be stressful, anxiety provoking,
and reduce perceived control18. The decision to wait means an-
other decision in the next period, and this might have come at
a psychological cost such as stress or anxiety, resulting in the
shorter delay in dynamic trials.19
Anxious subjects could reasonably trade off profit from wait-
ing longer for a reduction in anxiety by selling sooner than pre-
dicted by a no-anxiety benchmark. This hypothesis is also con-
sistent with a substantial literature on preference for resolution
of uncertainty in other areas of economics [29, 30, 31, 32, 33,
34].
Of course, to explain the fact that delays do get longer with
experience in the dynamic condition requires a further assump-
tion that anxiety is reduced across the experiment as subjects
get acclimated, which is plausible but not directly observed.
The conjecture that early selling is due to anxiety could be
tested in further experiments. For example, if the anxiety hy-
pothesis is correct, then increasing the clock time per period
should create earlier selling (assuming anxiety is a function of
clock time rather than just the number of periods). Another
interesting treatment would be to exogenously decrease or in-
crease stress and anxiety levels, and see if selling delays shrink.
(For example, Porcelli and Delgado[35] induce stress using a
cold-pressor task in which subjects immerse their hands in icy
water for two minutes, and show that risk aversion expressed
by gamble choices increases due to stress). Inducing anxiety in
the dynamic case only would further reduce the delay, and anx-
iety in the static case only would decrease the gap between the
two conditions. If empirically proven, a model incorporating
risk aversion and distaste for anxiety built in the utility function
could provide a more accurate description of timing decision
making.
round. However, most of the subjects indeed took time to explore and submit
their own selling times, and this was evidenced by the fact that their selling
times were uncorrelated with the default anchor values. On a side note, this
kind of waiting game could be quite engaging. In Cox et al.[17], they compared
the Dutch auction with the first-price sealed bid auction using lab experiments
to test the strategic equivalence between the two mechanisms. They found that
the prices in the Dutch auction were lower than those in the first-price auction.
One of their explanations of this discrepancy was that subjects got additional
utility, the utility-of-suspense from playing the Dutch auction waiting game,
and hence they waited longer, decreasing the prices. This was based on many
subjects comments that they enjoyed the Dutch auction experiment more than
the other auction formats because of the suspense of waiting. In personal con-
versations, some of the subjects in this study also made similar comments.
18Jap [27], in field interviews with suppliers participating in reverse auctions,
found that the compressed time frame of open-bid auctions creates a stressful
context for the supplier and many suppliers complained that the format pre-
vented them from carefully considering price bids and gave them a sense of
being out of control.
19Wood and Schweitzer[28] in their experiments induced different levels of
anxiety (high vs. low) and found negotiators experiencing high levels of anxiety
make steeper concessions and exit bargaining situations earlier.
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Appendix
Additional Results
Table A1: Percentage of trials with (un)censored Delay
All Dynamic Static
Right censored 26% 25% 28%
Uncensored 48% 49% 47%
Left censored 9% 8% 10%
Missing 16% 18% 15%
Total 100% 100% 100%
Figure A1: Scatter plot of success rates in dynamic and static trials.
Figure A2: Distribution of individual average Delay between dynamic and
static trials. The trials with right-/left-censored or uncensored Delays were in-
cluded.
Figure A3: Difference in average Delay between dynamic and static trials. The
trials with right-/left-censored or uncensored Delays were included. A dashed
line indicates a theory-predicted delay, τ = 21. Error bars indicate standard
errors. Paired t-test, t(62) = −5.46, p < 8.93 × 10−7; signed rank test,
z-value = −4.57, p < 0.0001.
Figure A4: Delay as a function of signal arrival period. Delay decreases as
a signal arrives late. The trials with right-/left-censored or uncensored Delays
were included. Error bars indicate standard errors. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001, ∗ ∗ p <
0.01, n.s.: not significant (paired t-test, one sided).
Figure A5: Delayuncensored as a function of the signal arrival period.
Figure A6: Scatter plot of Delayuncensored versus the signal arrival period.
Straight lines indicate fitted regression lines from B in Table A3. (A) UCLA
subjects. (B) Caltech subjects.
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Table A2: Results of regression analyses of Delayuncensored on the signal arrival time and experience
UCLA subjects only Caltech subjects only
Variable A B C D E F
Constant 46.502† 46.103† 50.864† 29.858† 31.004† 31.270†
(1.454) (1.276) (1.764) (0.760) (0.701) (1.000)
Signal -0.382† -0.392† -0.444† -0.211† -0.230† -0.233†
(0.017 (0.017) (0.022) (0.009) (0.011) (0.014)
Experience -0.226 -9.897† 2.073** -0.521
(1.218) (2.544) (0.730) (1.402)
Signal*Experience 0.030 0.146† 0.033† 0.039*
(0.016) (0.034) (0.009) (0.018)
R2 0.2168 0.2183 0.2245 0.3077 0.3102 0.3103
Adjusted R2 0.216 0.2174 0.2232 0.3066 0.3091 0.3086
F-statistic 262.58 264.84 182.92 277.13 280.42 186.86
Prob(F-statistic) <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Included Observations 1900 1900 1900 1250 1250 1250
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. †p < 0.0001, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, p < 0.118
Table A3: Results of random-effects regression analyses ofDelayuncensored
(subject random-effects incorporated)
Variable A B
Constant 40.813† 45.875†
(1.726) (1.787)
Signal -0.299† -0.374†
(0.010) (0.013)
Caltech -4.019 -15.280†
(2.547) (2.798)
Signal * Caltech 0.168†
(0.019)
R2 0.217 0.234
Included Observations 3150
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. †p < 0.0001.
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Instructions
Instructions
Thank you for participating in this experiment on the eco-
nomics of investment decision making. By participating, you
have already earned a $5 show-up fee. If you follow the in-
structions carefully you may be able to make additional money
that will be paid to you at the end of the experiment privately,
in cash. The dollar amounts mentioned below (and on your
screens) are experimental dollars. We will use a fixed conver-
sion rate to convert experimental dollars to real cash. The con-
version rate is 100 Experimental Dollars = 0.50 US Dollar
You are about to make selling decisions 100 times in a row.
Each round represents one trading round. You will be paired
with 5 other computer players, who are also sellers, in every
round. Note that you are NOT playing with other human par-
ticipants in the room. To make sure you understand the pro-
cedure, please complete the quiz following these instructions.
If you cannot answer the quiz questions yourself (with a little
guidance from us) you will not be allowed to proceed. Please
see the power point slides in front of you for the figures referred
to below.
Half of the rounds will be played in a dynamic condition
and the other half in a static condition. We will explain these
two conditions next.
Dynamic Trading Rounds In a dynamic trading round,
your job is to decide in real time when to sell an asset you are
holding. At the start of each trading round, everyone gets one
share of the same asset. The price of the asset begins at $1
(figure 1) and grows exponentially as trading time periods pass
(figure 2).
Each period lasts 250 milliseconds. In every period you are
making a real-time decision about whether to sell or whether
to wait. When you decide to sell your asset, press the ENTER
key. Once you have decided to sell, you have no more decisions
to makeyou just wait until the trading round ends. That is, you
make one and only one selling decision in each round.
The price of the asset increases by 4% in each trading pe-
riod. You will see the price increasing on your computer screen-
graphically in the price-period plot at the center of the screen.
The graph of prices is shown in the center of the screen (figure
3) and the numerical price is shown in the top right corner (fig-
ure 4). The current price is the same for all sellers (you and five
computer players).
It is possible that the price graph will go out of the top of the
screen in a very long round (figure 5). This is normal and does
not change anything about your decisions. Even if the graph
hits the top of the screen, the current price will continue to rise
and is displayed on the top right of the screen.
There are two ways a trading round can end:
(1) Once 3 players have all decided to sell; or
(2) The trading round reaches 300 periods after the true value
(explained below) of the asset has stopped growing, even though
fewer than three players have sold.
These rules mean that among the 6 players (including you
and five other computer players), only 3 players can actually
sell their stock before the round ends. If you sell before the
round ends, you earn an amount in $ equal to the price at which
you sold. If three others sell before you do, and the round ends,
then you will earn the maximum true value of the asset, as
explained below.
Here is how the true value is determined. At the start of
each trading round, the computer randomly selects a trading
period at which the true value growth will stop. The true value
is equal to the asset price until this pre-determined stopping
period; that is, the true value grows with the price (at the rate of
4%) and stops growing after the pre-determined stopping period
is reached, while the price continues to grow (at the rate of 4%)
in excess of the true value. The maximum true value of the asset
is equal to the asset price in the stopping period. If the trading
round continues beyond this period, the asset price still grows
as before, but the true value of the asset stays at its maximum
true value.
You will not learn right away when the true value has stopped
growing. After the true value stops growing, you will only re-
ceive a message (notice), with a delay that is equally likely to be
anywhere from 0 to 60 periods, indicating that the current price
of the asset is above its true value. So you will never know the
exact time period in which the true value stopped growing. A
red arrow will indicate the period in which you have received
that notice and that period will also be posted on the right-hand
side of the screen (figure 6, 7).
The random delay between the time the true value stops
growing and the message (notice) arrival is randomly chosen
separately for each player. Therefore, when you receive your
message, some players may have already received it, and some
might not have received it yet. Also, all the messages are pri-
vate, so you do not know when other players receive messages
and they do not know when you received your message.
In each trading period, there is a 2.5% chance that the true
value will stop growing (if it has not stopped already). This
percentage is constant in each period, which implies that even
if the round has just begun, there is a small (2.5%) chance it
will end in the next period, and even if the round has lasted a
long time, there is a small (2.5%) chance it will end in the next
period.
At the end of each trading round, your earnings and the
earnings of other players for this round will all be displayed on
your screen (figure 8). Note that in this example, the 3 players
who did not sell in time will receive the maximum true value of
the asset ($3.20 in the sample screen in figure 8).
In each round, you will be grouped with 5 new computer
players. They will receive the same amount of information as
you do (though at a different time in regards to the maximum
true value message). However, they will be playing with a pre-
determined strategy, which will remain consistent throughout
the experiment, but unknown to you.
Static Trading Rounds
The static trading rounds are the same as the dynamic rounds
with one difference: You are presented with your message, and
with all of the other information that is revealed across time in
the dynamic rounds, all at once (figure 9). More specifically,
you get to step outside of time and see what the stock price
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would be at any time under the assumption that the market had
not ended by that time. The period in which your message is
received is shown with a red arrow; remember that the mes-
sage is still randomly delayed from the time when the true value
stopped growing. You then choose at what price along the curve
you would sell (and the five computer players will be doing the
same).
You can explore the stock price over time by moving a little
blue bar on the screen (figure 10). Place a cursor on any point
on the white bar below the x-axis of the price-period plot to
move the blue bar. You do NOT have to hold a button on the
mouse. The period and the price corresponding to the location
of the blue bar will be automatically updated in the plot.
When you have determined the period in which (or the price
at which) you want to sell your asset, press the ENTER key to
submit your decision.
Once you submit your decision, the computer compares the
selling times of all 6 players (you and 5 other computer play-
ers), and determines earnings as in a dynamic round. First, the
computer calculates the time of the market ending as the time
by which the first 3 players had sold. If your selling time is
before the market ended, you will earn an amount equivalent to
the asset price at which you sold. If your selling time is after
that end time (i.e., three other players chose selling times earlier
than yours), you earn the maximum true value of the stock as in
the dynamic round.
To summarize:
1. You will be playing with 5 computer players (not other
people in the room).
2. Only 3 players can sell their asset before the trading round
ends.
3. In each trading round, the computer randomly chooses a
period and the true value of the asset grows with the price
up to this period. Afterwards, the price exceeds the true
value.
4. Those 3 players who submit their decision in time will
receive earnings equivalent to the asset price in the period
in which they sold their asset. Others will receive the
maximum true value of the asset.
5. In dynamic trading rounds, sellers make a real-time deci-
sion and will receive a message with a random delay after
the true value has reached its maximum.
6. In static trading rounds, sellers learn when a message
would have arrived (still with a random delay), had they
played this round in real time, and you can make a selling
decision without time pressure.
For you to become familiar with the software, we will ask
you to complete 10 practice rounds (5 dynamic rounds followed
by 5 static rounds). After completing the practice, you will go
through 5 blocks of rounds with each block consisting of 10
dynamic rounds followed by 10 static rounds.
At the end of the experiment, we will sum up the money you
earn in all trading rounds and pay you in cash. The conversion
rate is 100 Experimental Dollars = 0.50 US Dollar. Your total
earnings will be what you earned in the 100 rounds plus your
show-up fee of $5. Are there any questions?
You can read these instructions again yourself until you
understand how the experiment works. When you are ready,
please complete the quiz and let the experimenter know when
you are done.
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Figures for the instructions
Figure A7: The start of a trading round.
Figure A8: A trading round in action. The price grows exponentially.
Figure A9:
Figure A10:
Figure A11: This is not an error.
Figure A12: You will be notified that the true value has stopped growing al-
ready.
Figure A13: Note that the sentence in yellow will not appear in the actual
screen.
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Figure A14:
Figure A15: A static trading round.
Figure A16: Explore the price in each period with the mouse before submitting
your decision.
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Quiz
Name:
Quiz
True or False
1. You are playing with other people in the room. (True,
False)
2. The price of the asset increases at different rates in dy-
namic and static rounds. (True, False)
3. The price of the asset never decreases or stops. (True,
False)
4. The maximum true value of the asset is the same as the
asset price in the period when you receive a notice. (True,
False)
5. The true value of the asset always matches the price.
(True, False)
6. You earn the maximum true value of the asset when the
market ends before you decide to sell. (True, False)
7. In static trading rounds, all players earn an amount equal
to the price during the period in which they chose to sell.
(True, False)
8. There is a 2.5% chance that the true value stops increas-
ing in every period in static rounds. (True, False)
9. There is a 2.5% chance that the asset price stops increas-
ing in every period in static rounds. (True, False)
10. All the players receive the notice that the true value stops
growing, but at different time points. (True, False)
11. Your selling price is always greater than the true value of
the asset. (True, False)
12. A trading round ends once three players sold their asset.
(True, False)
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Subject Mean Dev Anxiety Learning Rate
1 22.32 0.08 0.16
2 6.51 0.10 0.20
3 7.46 0.07 0.14
4 6.71 0.09 0.18
5 9.41 0.10 0.20
6 7.51 0.09 0.18
7 5.54 0.07 0.14
8 4.98 0.04 0.08
9 9.95 0.10 0.20
10 8.26 0.07 0.14
11 5.79 0.06 0.12
12 56.16 0.00 0.00
13 6.65 0.10 0.20
14 6.39 0.10 0.20
15 34.98 0.00 0.00
16 6.62 0.10 0.20
17 8.17 0.10 0.20
18 7.67 0.09 0.18
19 7.04 0.07 0.14
20 11.47 0.09 0.18
21 7.75 0.10 0.20
22 4.46 0.10 0.20
23 8.50 0.09 0.18
24 7.18 0.10 0.20
25 7.00 0.10 0.20
26 6.60 0.10 0.20
27 7.71 0.08 0.16
28 4.80 0.10 0.20
Table A4: Best fit to the behavioral data for individual Caltech subjects.
Appendix .1. Tables for individual learning fits
Subject Mean Dev Anxiety Learning Rate
1 5.92 0.09 0.18
2 9.20 0.04 0.08
3 6.08 0.08 0.16
4 25.07 0.04 0.08
5 8.08 0.04 0.08
6 11.19 0.06 0.12
7 13.30 0.10 0.20
8 8.63 0.07 0.14
9 8.40 0.04 0.08
10 26.38 0.00 0.00
11 42.54 0.00 0.00
12 6.13 0.04 0.08
13 14.74 0.09 0.18
14 11.45 0.06 0.12
15 8.82 0.07 0.14
16 11.56 0.06 0.12
17 7.66 0.07 0.14
18 19.58 0.00 0.00
19 7.45 0.03 0.06
20 5.06 0.09 0.18
21 11.01 0.06 0.12
Table A5: Best fit to the behavioral data for individual UCLA subjects.
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